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Having equally valid premises pro and contra, what does a rational human being prefer? The
answer is: nothing. We designed a test of this kind and applied it to an artificial society, characterized
by a given level of mental ability. A stream of messages from media is supplemented by ongoing
interpersonal communication. The result is that high ability leads to well-balanced opinions, while
low ability produces extreme opinions.
I. HOW WE DECIDE WHAT IS RIGHT OR
WRONG
We read newspapers and watch TV every day. There
are many issues and many controversies. Since media
are free, we can hear arguments from every possible side.
How do we decide what is wrong or right? The first con-
dition to accept a message is to understand it; messages
that are too sophisticated are ignored. So it seems rea-
sonable to assume that our understanding depends on
our ability and our current knowledge. Here we show
that the consequences of this statement are surprising
and funny.
II. HOW DO WE LEARN
To demonstrate this, we propose a computational
model with two assumptions [1]. The first is that mes-
sages can be represented as points on a plane of a finite
area, say, a square a × a. A consequence is that we can
measure the distance between messages. The second as-
sumption is that we can understand a message if it is not
too far from what we already know.
As a direct consequence of these two assumptions, we
obtain a simple model of learning. In this model the
mind is represented by an area around the messages un-
derstood by the mind’s owner. Her/his ability is rep-
resented by a critical distance Dc. A new message can
be grasped if its distance to the closest previously un-
derstood message is shorter than Dc. If this distance is
longer, the message is ignored.
Let us consider a new area of experience: differential
calculus, traffic regulations, stock market, foreign policy
or classic Latin grammar can serve as examples. Initially
we know a small area on a square. Step by step, we
expand our knowledge each time when a new message
is found to be comprehensible. The speed at which the
known area expands is determined by the parameter Dc.
If it is comparable with size a of the square, the mind
understands everything after a few messages. However,
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if Dc/a is small, initially most of the incoming messages
are ignored, and the area of understanding expands very
slowly. This is demonstrated in Fig. 1, where we see
an area equivalent to the gained knowledge for Dc/a =
0.3 after 10 messages in panel a), and for Dc/a = 0.03
after 100 messages in panel b). In Fig. 2 we show the
fraction of messages that are understood as a function of
the number of all messages, also for these two values of
Dc/a.
III. AN EXAMPLE—HOW WE THINK ABOUT
POLITICS
As we are political animals, let us apply the model to
our political beliefs. In this field, public discussions are
most aggressive and arguments least convincing. Trying
to be objective—as scientists should be—we choose our
square to be symmetrically divided between two orien-
tations: Left and Right. The vertical axis can be inter-
preted as a measure of the distance between Authoritar-
ian and Libertarian, as in [2].
Let us suppose that our model mind is target of a
stream of messages, evenly distributed in the square.
Again, if Dc/a is close to 1, the situation is rather triv-
ial; the model mind quickly arrives at full understanding.
However, for small values of the ratio Dc/a the situation
is less trivial because bias comes into play. Let us assume
at first that our mind is initially unbiased; its owner ac-
cepts the first message if it appears within a circle of
radius Dc around the square centre. Yet we can expect
that a certain degree of bias will soon develop: it is un-
likely that the Left-Right symmetry is preserved for the
trajectory of a single mind. An example of this effect is
shown clearly in Fig. 1b.
To explain this, we refer to theory of random walk [3].
Suppose that our model is simplified to one dimension,
with steps towards left and right at discrete times with
equal probabilities. Suppose also that our mind made a
step in a given direction. We can then ask the question:
how long will it take until it returns? The theory tells
us: infinitely long on average.
Here we touch upon an important feature of our model.
It is clear that each mind will reach full understanding
after a sufficiently long time. However, the difference
between able (large Dc) and less able (small Dc) minds
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FIG. 1. The ‘mental history’ of a single actor: positions of
understood messages for a) Dc/a = 0.3 and b) Dc/a = 0.03.
Each actor starts from one message at the center of the square.
In case a) the actor understands almost all messages after a
few steps. In case b) the actor remains confined with her/his
knowledge, with a bias towards right (the bias direction is
random).
manifests itself always within a finite time. It is just our
own lifetime which is finite, and its length provides a
time scale for everything we do, including understanding
things. Compared with the ’infinitely long’ case from the
previous paragraph, this means that, once biased, many
of us will never reach objectivity again.
IV. THE TEST
To generalize our model, let us consider a large number
of minds, which are again target of a stream of messages.
As we have seen, whether we include their initial bias
or not is of secondary importance. Now we are going
to design a test of social common sense in our artificial
society. As the messages are evenly distributed, neither
Left nor Right arguments prevail. Knowing this, we can
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FIG. 2. The fraction of messages understood as a function
of the number of incoming messages, for Dc/a = 0.3 (upper,
green curve) and Dc/a = 0.03 (lower, red curve). Each actor
starts from one message at the center of the square. In this
log-log plot, the lower curve shows a vertical step between two
subsequently understood messages. Initially, such events are
rather rare.
expect that a reasonable person remains objective. What
is the result?
To answer this, let us introduce a probability p that
a given mind’s owner, when asked about her/his prefer-
ence, is going to answer ‘Right’. Likewise, a probability
q is assigned to the answer ‘Left’, with the obvious con-
dition p + q = 1. For each mind, the probability p will
be calculated as follows. The number of all messages
he or she understood within a given time is N . This
set is divided into N(L) and N(R), where N(L) is the
number of understood messages placed on the left part
of the square, and N(R) for the right part. Obviously,
N(L) +N(R) = N . Then, p = 〈x(R)〉/〈|x|〉, where
〈x(R)〉 =
N(R)∑
i
x(i) (1)
is the mean x-coordinate of messages on the right half-
plane, and,
〈|x|〉 =
N∑
j
|x(j)| (2)
is the mean absolute value of the x-coordinate of all mes-
sages. Probability p is now calculated separately for each
mind [1].
What is the probability distribution of p itself? The
answer is shown in Fig. 3, for different values of the ability
parameter Dc. As we see, both plots preserve the Left-
Right symmetry within the accuracy of statistical errors.
For large values of Dc the resulting probability distribu-
tion is centred around the value p = 12 . By contrast, for
small Dc the distribution consists of two sharp maxima
close to p = 0 and p = 1. In other words, in the former
3case of large ability a statistical mind answers ‘Left’ and
‘Right’ with equal probabilities. This is equivalent to the
answer “I don’t know”, the only reasonable answer be-
cause the incoming messages do not provide arguments
for a more decisive statement. However—and this is our
most important result—for a society characterized with
small ability Dc a statistical mind answers either surely
‘Left’, or surely ‘Right’. In other words, in the case of
small mental ability all opinions are extreme.
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FIG. 3. Histogram H(p) of the individual probabilities p for
Dc/a = 0.3 (central peak) and Dc/a = 0.03 (binomial curve).
The small asymmetry of the latter is a statistical fluctuation.
The results are averaged over 103 actors, 100 messages and
103 runs; one run means one set of messages, the same for all
actors. Here, initial positions of actors (their first understood
messages) are evenly distributed on the square.
V. ADDITIONAL REMARKS
The model [1] has been further developed to include
consequences of interpersonal communication: minds not
only hear but also articulate their opinions, which are
included to the stream of messages. To mention two main
results, we note that an intensive communication leads to
a clustering of opinions, which become more extreme even
for the case of moderate ability [4]. On the other hand,
the latter unanimity disappears if messages are addressed
to minds which are neighbours in the square of issues.
Then, again, the opinions are less extreme [5]. These
results lead one to be cautious about situations in which
unanimity is treated as good and conflict as evil. Alas, in
our world unanimity is almost always against somebody
else. In that case the contradistinction is not ‘unanimity
vs. conflict’, but rather ‘diversity vs. extreme’.
Paraphrasing Paul Géraldy, one could say that it is the
political party who chooses the man who will choose her.
This means that everybody will be chosen by some party.
Yet a simple “I don’t know” seems a good remedy against
an extreme ‘Yes’ or an extreme ‘No’. What is funny (at
least for us) is that this is the result of a model based on
statistical mechanics.
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